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Ziarek: Ziarek on Shapiro

Gary Shapiro, Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietzsche
on Seeing and Saying. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003. 458 pp. ISBN 0226750469.
Reviewed by Krzysztof Ziarek, SUNY - Buffalo
Response by Gary Shapiro, University of Richmond
Enactive Art: Thinking and Multiplicity
In Archaeologies of Vision, Gary Shapiro sets out to change our understanding of the role of
vision and its archaeology in Nietzsche and Foucault, and in particular to suggest the importance
to both thinkers of exploring alternatives to the dominant regimes of the visible. He takes issue
above all with the notion that Foucault critiques, or even rejects, vision and visibility because of
their inscription within the modern operations of power as surveillance, disciplining, and, more
recently, bio-power. As a counter to this widespread misperception of the aims of Foucault's
critique, Shapiro claims that we need first, to examine the archaeologies of vision, that is, the
conditions, mechanisms, and practices of rendering visible, and, second, to reevaluate the role of
vision and visibility in Foucault, as well as in the work of his greatest single influence, Nietzsche.
Disagreeing with, among others, Martin Jay, Shapiro argues that Foucault, rather than showing
that vision as such is dangerous, is interested in describing the rise and organization of various
forms of visibility and should, therefore, be seen not as a critic but as an archaeologist of vision:
So it is not a question of denigrating vision; it is rather a question of being alert to the
different visual practices, often quite conflicting, that operate in the same cultural space
and sorting out their specific structures and effects. Foucault has no arguments against
vision in general. He is an archaeologist of the visual who is alert to the differential
character of various visual regimes and to the disparate and possibly conflicting visual
practices of a single era. (9)
In Shapiro's view, Foucault not only does not disqualify vision but, on the contrary, diagnosing
and critiquing the changing dominant modes of visibility—from representation in Velázquez to
simulacra in Magritte or Warhol—he in fact strives for an alternative mode of visibility which
would resist the dominant patterns of making visible.
At the core of Shapiro's Archaeologies of Vision lies the idea of extending Foucault's
archaeological approach from discursive practices to the regimes of the visible. Shapiro is
interested in developing an archaeology of the visual that would be able to explore the changing
practices of visibility and, in particular, the shifting formations of visibility in painting. As he puts
it in the Preface, "Archaeologies of Vision aims at restating the question of what constitutes the
history of art in the language of Nietzsche, Foucault, and some of their intermediaries such as
Bataille, Klossowski, and Deleuze . . ." (xiv). As I have already mentioned, crucial to this
argument is Shapiro's contention that the critique of ocularcentrism in Nietzsche and Foucault
does not mean an abandonment of compromised vision and visibility for the sake of a nonocular
or nonvisual orientation but entails an attempt to explore alternative modes of visibility. To that
effect, working closely with Nietzsche's and Foucault's numerous remarks on painting, Shapiro
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engages in a series of ekphrases, that is, in a succession of verbal descriptions or accounts of
paintings and works of visual art. Indeed these numerous descriptions and readings of a wide
range of artworks from Raphael, Hals, Velázquez, and Lorrain, to Manet, Kandinsky, Klee,
Magritte, Warhol, and Michals, constitute the better part of the book. As a result, any sustained
attempt to address Shapiro's study would have to engage with the details of these numerous
interpretations, since it is these varied readings that trace the archaeology of the visible the author
is after, an archaeology which both tracks the changing patterns of visibility and diagnoses the
often disparate or even conflicting visual practices of the same age. Obviously, to undertake such
a response would require a different venue, one where there would be ample time to discuss in
some detail particular paintings, say Raphael's Madonnas, Manet's paintings challenging
perspective, or Magritte's simulacra of the pipe. It would entail analyzing not only Nietzsche's and
Foucault's comments discussed by Shapiro but also Shapiro's own commentary on these readings,
as well as his numerous extensions of such ekphrases to other paintings or artists. Here I can only
encourage you to read this fine book to become acquainted with the particulars of these
interesting descriptions and intricately woven commentaries. I would draw your attention in
particular to readings which, at least for me, stand out among the many proposed in this long and
careful study: Shapiro's reading of Foucault on Las Meninas, his comments on perspective in
Manet's paintings, or his analysis of Warhol and Pop Art in a debate with Arthur Danto.
Given these constraints, I will focus in the remainder of my presentation on one of the most
interesting strands of Archaeologies of Vision, namely on what I take to be its underlying
argument with regard to contemporary art. Shapiro sees contemporary art in terms of its different
way of thinking and instantiating the visual: no longer through the prism of representation, which
relies on the notion of the original/real to be represented/copied, but instead as continuously
multiplying simulacra. This reading highlights the fact that one of the most important ways in
which art can resist the monological tendency of many modern visual regimes is through
repetition deployed as an alternative to imitation. Thus, one could say that the visibility produced
by art today is one of intensifying repetition, no longer concerned with the proper or exact
representation of the non-existent original. The thinking of the visible at work in such art is a
thinking attentive to difference and repetition, and even more than that, a thinking which itself
produces difference and repetition. This approach evolves out of the intersection of Nietzsche's
notions of multiple perspectives and the eternal return of the same, Foucault's comments on
modern painting, and, above all, Deleuze's discussion of the phantom and the simulacrum. Set in
the context of Warhol and Pop Art, this reading engages polemically with Danto's interpretation
of Pop Art, which Shapiro sees as "making the (traditional) Hegelian point that art at its highest is
a reading, articulation, and presentation of the collective soul (Spirit or Geist) to itself" (353).
What worries Shapiro in Danto's approach is its elimination or drastic reduction of the role of
ekphrasis, of the verbal account of visual works, and the shift of focus onto the manner in which
Warhol's work raises philosophical questions not through its visual appearance but through its
reflection on the status of the work of art and its relation to reality. In short, Warhol's work is no
longer a representation of contemporary consciousness but "it is contemporary consciousness
itself" (353). Danto's interpretation takes its cue from the traditional duality of reality and art,
duality which seems to disappear in Warhol's work, in which a Brillo Box (the artwork) becomes
indiscernible from a Brillo box. Shapiro suggests that in Danto's view, it is only theory,
specifically a theory of art and of consciousness, that distinguishes between Warhol's artwork and
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its exact counterpart in the supermarket. In the end, "Danto thinks like a Platonist, who sees the
form or idea, not itself visible, that differentiates the artwork from a mere being" (356).
By contrast, for Foucault, the multiplying Brillo boxes draw our attention to the matrix or the grid
of multiplicity. These boxes no longer refer to the "original," "real" Brillo box, but instead keep
ceaselessly referencing one another in a spreading series of phantoms or simulacra. What Warhol
effects through repetition is an emptying out of meaning, as the boxes no longer refer to reality,
effecting a sudden illumination of multiplicity with nothing at its center. For Foucault, Warhol's
work cuts its relation to reality, and, as a result, as Shapiro suggests, the boxes refer to nothing
and "they say nothing" (357). What thus becomes most significant about Warhol's art is its
gesture of abandoning the dualism of the original and the copy and of exchanging this duality for
the grid of multiple simulacra. The notions of the simulacra and the phantom which Shapiro
deploys in his reading come from the Epicureans, who "held that objects throw off or radiate
infinitely many phantasms or simulacra, and so they are taken by Deleuze and Foucault as
providing a model of thinking that avoids the closures and unities of Platonic or Hegelian
dialectics" (358). The model of reality in Deleuze and Foucault is no longer one based on the
mirroring effects of the original and the copy, the idea and its appearance, but, instead, one which
operates on the principle of infinitely multiplying phantasms or simulacra. This shift from the
model of reality which casts thinking in terms of representation to the notion of continuously
differing simulacra produces a requisite transformation in thinking: "replacing a
representationalist image of thought with a form of thinking that understands difference and
repetition as primary features of being that need not be traced back to the concepts of identity and
resemblance" (358).
As Shapiro points out, Deleuze finds an analogue for this revolution in thought in art's shift from
representation to abstraction, in which art abandons the image but not, however, visuality itself.
On the contrary, the forgoing of the image opens up a new perspective on visuality, allowing
painting, and more broadly, visual and media art, to examine, in a quasi-archaeological manner,
the emergence and constitution of the modern regime(s) of the visual. In Foucault, Shapiro
remarks, this change corresponds to the difficult manner of thinking acategorically, that is, apart
from categories, without allowing such thinking released from the organizing principle of
categories to become simply tantamount to what Foucault calls "stupidity." Deleuze's remarks on
Pop Art, which works by rupturing the hierarchical relation between originals and copies, shows
how this different thinking evinces an ethical dimension. In Deleuze's formulation, Warhol's use
of technological means of reproducing images produces an ontological shift in reality, in which
the foundational conception of the original and its always imperfect copies becomes displaced in
favor of the notions of difference and otherness evidenced by the multiplying simulacra. As
Shapiro puts it in his remarks on Deleuze's reading of Warhol, "the truth of art is not in imitation,
but in repetition" (362). Art thus becomes an emblem of the Nietzschean return of the same,
where what returns and repeats itself are differences, differences which each time, with each
recurrence, occur differently, resulting in an endless multiplication of difference as its own
simulacrum.
I would like here to briefly examine this argument which Shapiro evolves from Deleuze and
Foucault into the context of technology, or of what Heidegger calls the essence of technology, and
which, for the purpose of keeping it distinct from the notion of technology understood as

BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 6, Number 1 (Winter 2007)

0

3

Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature, Vol. 6, No. 1 [2018], Art. 1

technological processes, means, or products, is referred to as technics or technicity. What prompts
this manner of questioning is, on the one hand, the fact that, while Archaeologies of Vision
repeatedly touches on the issue of technology, because of its specific interests and goals, it does
not explicitly raise this problem as, historically speaking, increasingly determining both the status
of art and its aesthetic practices. On the other hand, I am also interested in exploring whether
contemporary art stops, as it were, at the moment of what Foucault calls "the sudden illumination
of multiplicity itself." Do artworks like Warhol's point beyond a painterly instantiation of the grid
of multiplicity, drawing attention precisely to the manner in which contemporary technicity
subtends and organizes our regimes of the visual and their aesthetics of multiplicity?
My question has to do with the force of resistance and difference which both Deleuze and
Foucault associate with the proliferation of simulacra. I agree with Shapiro that the visibility
operating in terms of differentially repeating simulacra resists the monological or monocular
tendencies of vision, testifying to the multiple and differential character of seeing, and
complicating any claims about a possible unity of the practices of the visible. At the same time,
this kind of displacement or, to put it more strongly, discarding, of the original/copy binary for the
optics of multiplying simulacra without the original, as Benjamin may be taken to point out, lies
at the heart of the operations of modern technology. Indeed, there are many indications that
modern technology, or better, technicity, works on the principle of resistance to and the almost
emblematic dispersion of the monological vision of reality. In this view, technicity can be seen in
terms of its resistance to the older, monocular patterns of visibility, say in a manner parallel to the
way that, for Foucault, disciplinary power replaced the monological law of the father. But then, as
Foucault argues, bio-power has already displaced, or at least requalified and recast, the practices
of disciplining and surveillance characteristic of modernity. Against this backdrop, the productive
and regulative vectors of bio-power can be seen in Nietzschean terms as a further stage or a
contemporary intensification of the will to power.
In a Heideggerian reading, bio-power and its regimes of visibility would signal another step in the
intensification of the essence of technology, or of technicity. As Heidegger remarks in his 1941
lecture series, Basic Concepts, technology taken in this sense is an already decided mode of
world-interpretation:
The modern position is the "technological." It is not technological because there are steam
engines and then the combustion motor, but there are these things because the epoch is
technological. What we call modern technology is not only a tool and a means, over and
against which today's man can be a master or servant. Before and beyond these possible
attitudes, technology is an already decided mode of world-interpretation, which
determines not only the means of transportation, subsistence, and recreation but also the
possibilities for any human attitude whatsoever . . . .That means the practical mastery of
technology in its unconditional development already presupposes a metaphysical
subjugation to technology. (15)
Modern technology succeeds brilliantly in calculation and calculative manipulation of reality,
because the actual comes to be revealed as already enframed by technicity, that is, as in principle
calculable, or in today's terms, as information, open not only to cognition but also to ceaseless
reprocessing and engineering. Heidegger's claim here is that contemporary reality is shaped by a
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long-standing, metaphysical subjugation to technicity, subjugation which points back to ancient
Greece, but which in fact becomes visible only retrospectively, at the time of modernity's
culmination. As a matter of fact, this pointing back to Greece becomes itself visible only to the
modern, technicist eyes, eyes which are already open before, as it were, we can see or deploy
technological prostheses utilized for increased visibility. As Heidegger continues,
"Accompanying this subjugation within us is an attitude that grasps everything according to plan
and calculation, and does so with a view to vast time-spans [sic] in order willfully and knowingly
to secure what can last for the longest possible duration" (Basic Concepts 14). This metaphysical
subjugation disguises itself as will to power, which in turn presents itself as the human will to
dominate and manipulate. It is indeed the human will to develop and master technology that
indicates this long-standing subjugation to technicity, subjugation whose operative terms translate
in the contemporary world into the global reach and density of the vectors of bio-power.
What I am suggesting here is that perhaps the multiplicity, the simulacra-like operations of
modern visibility, already constitute channels of the essentially technicist—at least in Heidegger's
view—operations of power. The issue, then, would be, on the one hand, what kind of effects
technicity has on the possibilities of vision and visibility, and, on the other, the resistance capacity
intrinsic in the visibility which operates on the principle of multiplying simulacra. Without doubt,
simulacra resist the tendency of the metaphysical forms of visibility to seek the original, establish
its centrality, and thus turn all simulacra into the always imperfect copies of the (missing)
original. In fact, as Shapiro's study eloquently shows, what I am calling here tentatively
"metaphysical visibility"-- and Deleuze would have probably agreed with this term—is never
simply monocular, despite its strong impulse in this direction. This metaphysical visibility has
always been, at least potentially, a clash between monocular vision and visibilities operating in
terms of phantoms or simulacra. Perhaps what we call the end of modernity is the stage at which
this conflict emerges as constitutive of the metaphysical field of Western vision. If that were the
case, then simulacra would be a matter of resistance in relation to the monological templates of
the visual. However, the multiplicity of simulacra would at the same time indicate the deployment
of the most contemporary vectors of technicity, as perhaps suggested by developments in genetic
engineering, cloning, replication of information, etc.
Given Shapiro's diagnosis of contemporary art, a diagnosis with which I agree to a large extent, I
would like to ask whether we perhaps need to give a further turn to what Foucault calls
acategorical thinking. Specifically, what I would like to signal in this context is the degree to
which such thinking operating in contemporary forms of the visual can be seen as enactive, that
is, as enacting a transformed relatedness, contrasting with forms of relations instantiated by the
technological regimes of the visual. I am choosing this term "enactive" deliberately in order to
emphasize two points. First, the thinking at issue here, thinking exemplified in modernist and
contemporary art, is not reflective, representational, or imitative, but constitutes, instead, a kind of
act. Second, this thinking is not "inactive," with the prefix "in," even though it is often mistakenly
taken to be so. As homophones, "enactive" and "inactive" sound identical and remain
indistinguishable in speech. The distinction between enactive and inactive indeed becomes visible
only in writing, and its becoming visible may signal an emergence of an altogether different
visibility, one on whose parameters modernity has been laboring at least since Nietzsche. At stake
in this play between "enactive" and "inactive" is a displacement of the notion that the enactive
manner of thinking involved in art is simply inactive, that is, passive and without effect, or that its
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production of difference is just a reproduction devoid of transformative force or of any ability to
intervene in the so called "real world." At one point in his book, Shapiro mentions the "force of
painting" (323), the force which I would like to consider here more closely. One way to do this is
to ask whether this force associated with painting can indeed be explained in terms of resistance
to the forms of visibility produced in modern disciplinary or carceral societies. If that is the case,
then such resistance risks being limited to reactive forces, while its seemingly creative impulse
may simply constitute a version or a modality of reactive action responding to the disciplining and
formative social forces. Would there be any room left for Nietzsche's sense of the creative force,
one that would be beyond a yes and a no, an affirmative force to the second degree, so to speak:
creative, and perhaps even transformative, without being reactive?
Returning to the first aspect of enactive thinking, we can see that, as an act, such thinking
precedes theory and practices, reflection and doing. In the opening paragraph of "Letter on
Humanism," Heidegger describes thinking as prior to both theory and practice: "Thinking does
not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it becomes applied.
Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the
highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man" (Basic Writings 217). This "action" is
the simplest, because it concerns the way in which the world has always already become open to
us, the way it has been laid out, as Heidegger suggests in Basic Concepts using the word
Weltauslegung (world-interpretation), but, more originarily, the laying out of the world. Such
thinking is the highest not because it transcends the everyday world and practice, but because,
conversely, everyday acting and living are always already embedded in it, embedded not in a
transcendental but instead an originative, enacting manner. It is the highest for Heidegger because
it lays out the vectors which shape the ways in which relations unfold and are carried out. Toward
the end of the essay, Heidegger returns to this point: "Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also
surpasses all praxis. Thinking towers above action and production, not through the grandeur of its
achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its
inconsequential accomplishment" (262). This neither theoretical nor practical deed of thinking
enacts, brings into being, and renders visible in a manner that is no longer metaphysical, and thus
also no longer technicist. And it is not technicist because, as Heidegger points out, it does not
make, produce, or effect—it does not open up what is by enveloping it into the operations of
power. Yet because this thinking does not produce or effect, from the point of view of the
metaphysics of production, it appears to be "inactive," rather than "enactive." It seems to do
nothing and, as such, to constitute the opposite of all action: it comes to be seen as the epitome of
passivity and indifference, characterizations we know only too well from Marxist and Frankfurt
School critiques of Heidegger.
Such thinking could be seen as enactive only when it calls into question and displaces the
technicist laying out of the world, since within the already technicist operations of power, this
thinking appears to be sapped of all force, an empty theorizing, with no desire or power to act.
Yet this thinking is enactive precisely to the extent that it transforms the manner in which the
world comes to be laid out and thus opened to interpretation and action, to practice and reflection.
This way of thinking (en)acts by no longer subjugating the way that the world lays itself out for
us to technicity. If technicity is a laying out of the world which presents the world, in the sense of
rendering it present, as intrinsically available in its "postmodern," dazzling display of multiplicity,
difference, and repetition, the thinking which, by contrast, would not subjugate itself to technicity
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would have to enact in a manner that, as I have suggested elsewhere, would free and disengage
itself from power.
For Heidegger, such thinking is poietic; it acts and reveals poietically rather than technicistically,
and, as such, finds itself at work in particular in artworks. This poietic thinking would be enactive
in just this sense that, without producing or effecting anything, without acting in the usual sense
of the term, it would call into question the technicist way in which the modern world opens and
lays itself out as intrinsically available: as a multitude of differences available to various and
increasingly flexible forms of calculation without the need to order them in relation to an origin or
an original. In the context of Heidegger's engagement with technicity and the a-metaphysical ("a"
privative) thinking, I would like to return to the question of the relation between the "sudden
illumination of multiplicity itself," so critically important to Deleuze and Foucault, and technicity.
Contemporary art most frequently challenges and resists the temptations of the monocular
visibility, and here I agree with Shapiro, through the repetition of simulacra and the multiplicity
of perspectives. But then, we also need to ask whether this multiplicity, whether Nietzschean,
Deleuzian, or Foucauldian, is not "always already" outstripped by the technicist operations of
power, and whether its illumination does not precisely throw light on the pervasiveness and
multiplicity of operations with which technicity lays out today's world. Put differently, does not
the archaeology of the contemporary visibility of the multiplicity of simulacra show this form of
visibility to be precisely technicist? Are the resistances evinced by contemporary art intrinsic to
the intensifying deployment of technicity or can art also elicit and draw out a different, poietic
Auslegung, a non-technicist laying out of the world? This form of eliciting or educing would be
the enactive thinking of art, its "deed" before theory and practice. It is on this question, I think,
that our answer to questions about the status and significance of contemporary art, might pivot.
Thanking Gary Shapiro for his important and thought-provoking book, I would like to say that,
giving us numerous illuminating comments on Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze, on painting and
the changing regimes of the visual, Archaeologies of Vision also did what the adjective I have just
used to describe it said literally: it provoked me to think through the issue of visibility and
multiplicity raised persuasively by the author. I hope that it continues to elicit questions and
discussions crucial to our understanding of art.
Response by Gary Shapiro
Diagrams and Multiplicities
Krzysztof Ziarek frames the question of art's possibilities in terms of Heidegger's notion of poietic
thinking. Relying on that thought—which he has articulated and explored in powerful and
nuanced ways elsewhere—he asks whether the art of multiplicity is or can be an affirmative form
of poietic thinking or whether it is necessarily in thrall to the reign of Technik. In Archaeologies
of Vision (AV) I discuss the Heideggerian problematic of presence and absence in the visual
discourse or metaphorics characterizing Western thought since Plato. Heidegger drew attention to
the specifically visual character of the Platonic eidos and idea. He reads Plato's story of the cave,
demonstrating how it obscures obscurity itself, in its artful construction of the stages of
philosophical illumination (a demonstration that Luce Irigaray presupposes in "Plato's Hystera.")
In Archaeologies of Vision I argue that Heidegger's questioning of vision's role in the Western
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metaphysical tradition need not be understood as a "denigration" of vision but as a stimulus to
rethink what vision is. I claim that Foucault is rethinking vision in the wake of Heidegger and
Nietzsche.
Still, I have some difficulties with Heidegger, and so with Ziarek's question. I hope that
explaining them briefly at the outset will help to clarify the project of Archaeologies of Vision and
perhaps help to articulate some of the ways in which I would like to continue to think about the
possibilities for art. My questions to Heidegger and so to Ziarek center upon thinking, poietic
thinking, and Technik. Yes, Heidegger made a decisive contribution in renewing the question was
heisst Denken? ("what is thinking?"). But I have to agree with Alain Badiou that Heidegger is
one-sidedly "poetic," seeing the poem as the only real possibility for thought. For example, he
disvalues mathematics, understanding it as simply part of the calculating, measuring, and
totalizing power of Technik. With Plato, Kant, Peirce, Bergson, Deleuze and others I would stress
the thinking (and creative thinking) involved in mathematical thought.
The theme of the matheme and the poem leads to two related questions about multiplicity and
affirmation. Is the art of the multiple affirmative or reactive? And, more generally, what are the
possibilities of affirmative art today? Ziarek identifies one of the major topics of Archaeologies of
Vision: its concern with the way in which the art of multiplicity can offer an alternative and
possible resistance to "monocularism," or more generally, to restrictive visual regimes. He says
that he agrees with me, both of us in the wake of Nietzsche, Foucault, Benjamin, Deleuze and
others, that much of recent and contemporary art is indeed an art of multiplicity. Ziarek goes on to
raise what he calls a Heideggerian question as to how this art, which engages in a multiplication
of the simulacrum or the phantasm, is best understood in relation to technology or technicity
(Technik). Does the art of multiplicity exhibit a resistance to technicity or does it in fact always
operate under its sway and in its shadow? I raised a similar question in the first section of the
book, titled "Iconoclasm and Indoctrination: The Taliban and the Teletubbies." When I was
writing that section before 9/11, the Taliban had gained international cultural attention by their
iconoclastic destruction of the monumental Buddhas of Bamiyan. However great the loss to art,
religion, and history involved in those explosions—which may in one sense be the largest scale
iconoclastic act of all time—the destroyers apparently understood it as a principled act of political
and religious power. For them, those colossal statues were unclean, blasphemous, and forbidden
idols. We can note that Mohammed Atta, captain of that day's hijackers, was also an iconoclast.
He had written an MA thesis on the preservation of the traditional Arab city in the context of
globalization/Americanization. For Atta the twin towers must not only have represented United
States power, they must also have appeared as contemporary versions (simulacra?) of the Tower
of Babel. Iconoclasm is typically straightforward in its attribution of power to the image and in its
own exercise of power. In Archaeologies of Vision I paired an account of Taliban iconoclasm
with some questions about the children's television program, The Teletubbies, where questions of
power and principle are not so obvious. In other words, I think I was raising the question, in
Ziarek's terms, whether this apparently most innocent delight for infants ought to be described as
one that operated by means of the simulacrum of the TV screen to invite its audience to imagine
themselves as cyborgs networked to an abyssal succession of simulacral images. Is The
Teletubbies then simply a demonstration of the reign of technicity, sporting with its power in the
bodies and minds of the young? Here Ziarek and I might both find it useful to invoke Heidegger's
discussion of Technik.
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Ziarek calls attention to my contrast of Foucault and Arthur Danto in their very different accounts
of Andy Warhol. I suggest that Foucault is alert to the multiplicity of "the eternal phantasm,"
whereas Danto is captivated by the exact resemblance of Brillo Box and its mundane model while
neglecting the multiplicity of the many boxes. Is Warhol then simply instantiating Technikin his
multiplication of images? Or does his work taken on a larger scale—not focusing as Danto does
on a single replica of the Brillo Box—interrogate the technological itself? Foucault's ekphrasis of
Warhol mentions advertising images, car crashes, and electric chairs. He in turn is commenting on
Deleuze's discussion of Warhol and Pop Art in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze explains that
this work intervenes in a "daily life . . . [that is] standardized, stereotyped and subject to an
accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption . . . in order to make the two extremes
resonate—namely the habitual series of consumption and the instinctual series of destruction and
death. Art connects the tableau of cruelty with that of stupidity, and discovers underneath the
consumption a schizophrenic clattering of the jaws, and underneath the most ignorant destructions
of war, still more processes of consumption." Ziarek acknowledges the power of resistance in
such art, but asks whether and how the art of the multiple in the age of Technik can be poietically
productive and affirmative. I will attempt to answer his question by first clarifying Foucault's
notion of the diagram (and emphasizing its affinities with Heidegger's idea of the productive Riss
which is the originative opening of the work of art) and then raising some questions about how we
are to understand Ziarek's concept of affirmative art.
In Archaeologies of Vision I give some attention to the Foucauldian notion of the diagram, which
elicited some fine pages of commentary from Deleuze. The diagram is a dispositif, an
arrangement of forces, a crossing of geometry, power, and invention. It is not merely a technicist
device in the service of a holistic project of enframing. The diagram enacts (to use Ziarek's term,
and to speak with Heidegger) by opening up, disclosing, and letting be. Heidegger's discussion of
the originality of the work of art, its originative character, is relevant here. The Greek temple, as
Heidegger describes it in "The Origin of the Work of Art," sets forth a world and lets the earth be
an earth. Heidegger's elucidation of this originarity is couched in terms that suggest diagrammatic
qualities: Gestalt, Riss, Abriss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss. The Foucauldian notion of the
diagram that I attempt to develop in Archaeologies of Vision is perhaps indebted to Heidegger in
ways that might seem surprising if we think only of the contrast, say, between the Greek temple at
Paestum and the Panopticon. The diagram, Foucault argues, is a form or manifestation of
power/knowledge. It is not merely reactive or repressive but "productive" (Foucault's analogue of
Ziarek's "enactive"?). Two of the several diagrams of art that I discuss in Archaeologies of
Visionare Nietzsche's schema of the tragic theater in The Birth of Tragedy (BT) and Foucault's
sketch of the development of a new conception of the space of viewing (the museum, gallery, and
similar spaces) in his lectures on Manet and elsewhere. Nietzsche (in section 8 of BT)
demonstrates the doubled perspective of the onlooker (Zuschauer) in the Greek theater. Nietzsche
focuses on the architecture of the theater, and later he explicitly says that architecture is neither
Apollonian nor Dionysian. It is, we might say, art in "the grand style." The theater involves a
framing that enables what Nietzsche calls an Übersehen. The spectators simultaneously look
down on the tragic actors on the skene and also look up at them in so far as they identify with the
chorus in the orchestra below the skene. This diagram contrasts with what Nietzsche, in another
diagrammatic analysis, calls the "one great Cyclops eye" of Socrates. I argue that for Nietzsche
both the hidden image of archaic times and the double vision in the Greek theater were
alternatives to the aesthetics of presence. In a fairly direct if unsubtle reading of Heidegger we
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might suppose that given the preplatonic situation of both of these visual practices, he might see
them as enactive forms of visual thinking (borrowing Ziarek's term again), forms that bear a
relationship to Platonic vision (as in the myths of Republic and Phaedrus) analogous to the
relationship that the words of the presocratics have to the Platonic metaphysics of presence. Of
course, both the hidden image in the archaic temple and the double vision of Greek theater
involve a setup or dispositif, an arrangement of spaces and practices, that might be called
technological. Would Heidegger or Ziarek see the reign of Technik as extending so far? I suspect
not, if Technik involves calculation and predictability, as Ziarek suggests, for it seems that it is the
happening of difference that emerges in these situations. But if these too are instances of Technik,
then I wonder whether the notion has been extended so far that it no longer has a meaningful
alternative or contrast.
By the time of Aristotle, the sense of the double perspective and so of the visual and performative
dimension of tragedy has been almost completely obscured. Foucault's most highly developed
analysis of the diagram is his discussion of the Panopticon, which has led to his being
misconstrued by some commentators (e.g. Martin Jay) as being an anti-visual thinker. But I try to
show in Archaeologies of Vision that Foucault understood the changes in art and its viewing
practices that cluster for him around the figure of Manet as the development of another visual
diagram. It replaces the transparency of Panoptic windows with the limitation to the frame and the
canvas. Traditional illumination is discarded, indirect glances replace the gaze, the windows of
the Panopticon are shuttered, and a new diagram of visibility is instituted. While revisionary art
historical thinkers like André Malraux show how the museum and photographic reproduction
reduce (and Heidegger would say enframe) art, Foucault sees that in some ways the museum and
Manet's painting are productive.
Suppose that the modern system of the arts (as Paul Kristeller showed) takes form only in the
eighteenth century; and suppose that its institutionalization tends, intentionally or not, to
compartmentalize the arts, detaching them from their associations with festival and its social
volatility. Let us acknowledge that the signature practice of the museum is close attention to
visual surfaces, which practice tends to lead to dissociation of painting from the festive and the
political, and that the museum thus becomes an emblem of modernism, understood, following
Kant and Clement Greenberg, to consist in the establishment of distinct realms of the theoretical,
the practical, and the aesthetic. Foucault can acknowledge all this and does in his lectures on
Manet and in his discussion of the museum in "Fantasia of the Library." Yet even as the dispositif
of the museum is crystallizing, its form provokes and allows consequences that were at first
unintended. Manet's painting and Flaubert's Temptation of St. Anthony deploy the structures of
library and museum to open up new possibilities of writing and seeing. Modernists may read this
as brilliant ways of ironizing (and thus reinforcing) the fundamentals of genres and practices.
Foucault, like Deleuze, thinks that irony is highly overvalued. While Foucault could be said to be
situating and urbanizing the Heideggerian Riss or Gestalt, he is suspicious of positions like later
Heidegger's occasional claim that anything which arises from Technik is necessarily caught up in
a project of total reframing. The metanarratives involved in what we used to call the Plato-to-Nato
story will yield, I think, to the kind of analysis that Foucault articulates in "Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History."
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I am suspicious of the monism, the re-emergence of the One, involved in Heidegger's concept of
the current incarnation or dispensation of being, while I acknowledge the critical value of
reflecting on the framing and manipulation implicit and explicit in our assumptions and practices.
Here we have an issue about thinking that has provoked Heidegger's most acute (mostly French)
readers and critics to ask penetrating questions, not rejecting his question about thinking, but
questioning the limitations of the way in which he posed it: Why must the remains of the
Presocratics and a few German poems form the horizon of the question?
Since, as Ziarek notes, much of Archaeologies of Vision is concerned with the question of
ekphrasis, of what Foucault calls the "infinite relation" of seeing and saying, there may be a point
in recalling some of the limitations in Heidegger's ekphrases. If Heidegger is our inspiration for
understanding poietic thinking, should we not be very cautious—following his call for "the
cultivation of the letter" in the Humanism text—in looking at his own writing? Consider the most
celebrated and notorious Heideggerian ekphrasis, that of van Gogh's painting of the two shoes. I
omit a quotation of this well-known, solemn invocation of a peasant woman's life on the earth and
of the art historian Meyer Schapiro's equally naive description of the painting as van Gogh's
meditation on his own situation through depicting a "personal object," supposedly his own shoes.
Heidegger says about his ekphrasis "this painting spoke," and that reminds me of one of
Nietzsche's notes: "if the visual arts could speak they would sound stupid to us." As Derrida
demonstrated, both of these ekphrases foreclose the possibility of multiplicity, both return the two
shoes to a single owner. The doubling of two left shoes, dramatically unlaced, is perhaps the
simplest form of multiplicity, one that is amplified in Derrida's conceit of a "polylogue for n+1
female voices." (I note parenthetically that it is perhaps an unfortunate effect of Heidegger's
monistic conception of Technik—which tends to engulf the mathematical—that the mathematical
dimensions of essays like Derrida's "Restitutions" have been neglected by all readers, so far as I
know.) That Heidegger did not thematize the question of ekphrasis—as Foucault, Lyotard,
Derrida, and Kristeva do—should make us cautious in using his conception of poietic thinking to
assess the prospects of the visual or spatial arts. We need to ask whether Heidegger's poietic
thinking can count beyond one. When Heidegger says "this painting spoke," we want to ask the
Nietzschean question "who is speaking?"
With all these reservations, let me say that I find Heidegger's thought about place and space
enormously suggestive for thinking about the possibilities of contemporary art and the art to
come, something that I tried to explore in writing about the American "earthworks artist" Robert
Smithson (whose most famous work, Spiral Jetty, is in the Great Salt Lake).
For now, I want to turn to the issue/question of ekphrasis. As Ziarek observes, much of
Archaeologies of Vision is devoted to the question of ekphrasis, the literary or discursive genre in
which a verbal text describes or evokes a visual work of art—as the subtitle says, the book
concerns "Foucault and Nietzsche on seeing and saying." (I acceded to the editor's advice to
reverse the chronological order of the names.) Specifically, I worry, explore, question, read and
reread some of the ekphrases that these two thinkers produced. Although Foucault's essay on Las
Meninas is well known, as is his little book on Magritte, there are many other accounts of painting
scattered about in his writings, both in single books and in the many interviews and essays in Dits
et écrits. A few have noticed Nietzsche's description of Raphael's Transfiguration, but he has
much more to say about Raphael, Claude Lorrain, Dürer and others. I did not at first realize that it
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was this questionable genre of ekphrasis that was the nerve of the book, its obsessive line of
flight. It is, I see in retrospect, my own gesture toward multiplicity, for I attempted to account for
as many of these ekphrases as I could, extrapolating sometimes from a few sentences here or
there, and occasionally adding a few of my own that seemed to amplify the practice of Nietzsche
or Foucault. Sometimes I saw points of contact, contrast, or variation, as with Nietzsche's Greek
theater and Foucault's Panopticon as diagrammatic structures, or Nietzsche's lordly naming of
Raphael's hovering Christ as Apollo and Foucault's analysis of the floating image of the pipe in
Magritte in their shared concern with the phantasm. I eventually saw that I was following
Deleuze's suggestion that we must read Foucault diagonally, experimentally, seeing the entire
project across essays and interviews as well as the more celebrated books. I was choosing an
angle, a perspective, a line of flight marked by a series of crossroads, intersections, of word and
image, as Foucault explains in his review of Panofsky. I began to wonder how philosophical
textual practices were related to images, or what sort of thinking happens in the crossings or
chiasms generated by this practice. It was a revelation to find that Foucault had added an
illustration to the second edition of the History of Madness, Frans Hals's seventeenth-century
group portrait of The Regentesses of the Old Men's Almshouse, but that nowhere in the text had he
mentioned these cold, frightening figures dispensing judgment, and gazing with steely, merciless
eyes. Instead, Foucault referred in an interview to a brilliant ekphrasis by Paul Claudel, a
Christian thinker whom some might be surprised to find Foucault celebrating. As Foucault says in
his Las Meninas essay, there is an infinite relation between what we say and what we see, and that
essay itself, I argue, needs to be read not only as an ekphrasis but as a commentary on that
practice. There is a crack or a rift between seeing and saying as well as a rich interplay of the two
that itself varies with different visual regimes. It is this rift itself that can operate as the opening
for various practices of writing, marking, depicting, and image-making, including some of those
focused on the production of multiplicity.
What's interesting in ekphrasis is the gap, the "infinite relation." It's a "hole" in Technik, one
perhaps that is constantly being covered over—by writers, docents, audio guides in museums,
new internet technologies—and yet which is continually opening up again. It's not just the case
that Nietzsche and Foucault favor an art of multiplicity, although on the whole they do. It's also
that their practice of ekphrasis exhibits and reflects on the gap, the infinite relation, of what
Deleuze will call discursivity and visibility in his commentary on Foucault. Nietzsche marks this
edge in his description of Raphael's Transfiguration when he renames the floating Christ as
Apollo. In his essay on Magritte Foucault understands the celebrated "this is not a pipe"
painting—its actual title is Les deux mystéres (The two mysteries)—as a disassembled calligram,
so that there is an abyssal relation between his verbal account of the painting and the painting's
internal play of word and image. In Foucault's best known ekphrasis, that of Velazquez's Las
Meninas, he forces us to think the ekphrastic genre by explaining his own initial protocol of
proceeding without the use of proper names. He performs the fiction of the lecturer and docent in
insinuating the first person plural, the "we," with whom the reader/auditor/spectator unreflectively
identifies, before questioning the possibility of that "we" construction when the painting is
summoned up again in "man and his doubles."
Archaeologies of Vision explores the question of ekphrasis as the gap or the edge between seeing
and saying. A fuller philosophical inventory of this question, one that I hope to elaborate, would
focus on a much wider body of texts than those of Nietzsche and Foucault. It might begin with
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Homer's celebrated description of the shield of Achilles in the Iliad, an ekphrasis of an impossible
work of art purportedly composed by a blind man. As this canonical example suggests, absence
and distance are there from what we take to be the beginning of this genre, and variations on the
theme are played by such ancient art writers as Philostratus and Pliny. The question of the
absence of the work is thematized by Diderot in his Salons (meant to be read by those who could
not see the pictures he was describing), and by August Schlegel in Die Gemälde, a dialogue about
the paintings in the Dresden Gallery (one of Nietzsche's main sources). Schlegel's characters
discuss the paintings from a distance, not in the gallery, but out on the Belvedere overlooking the
river, in order to exacerbate the "infinite relation." Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind is a detailed
examination of the chiasmatic relations of seeing and saying.
If Ziarek is right—I extrapolate from his remarks—then I have produced a guidebook—a
Cicerone, the title of Burckhardt's guide to Italian art that Nietzsche admired so much—a
guidebook to the ruins of a rather pervasive agon between monocular and multiple vision. It is
limited to a rather specific slice of thought as it emerges in Nietzsche, Foucault, and some of their
antagonists, interlocutors, and sources. Like Burckhardt's guide, and unlike Hegel's, mine aims at
being more archaeological and geographical than at exhibiting a dialectical and historical
development. In that sense it is not a brief for contemporary art. If it does not pose the question of
whether contemporary art of the multiple can free us from the reign of Technik, as Ziarek says, it
also does not buy into those metanarratives, whether Hegelian or Heideggerian, in which the
possibilities of human authenticity and the fate of thinking pivot on the question of whether
contemporary art can be trulypoietic, whether the art to come will fulfill a certain promise.
Nevertheless, I agree with Ziarek that there are limitations, call them if you will technological,
that structure Nietzsche's and Foucault's engagement with the visual. As I suggest very briefly in
the Preface to Archaeologies of Vision, for all of Nietzsche's brilliant account of the structured
double vision of the tragic theater and of Foucault's sketch of the diagram of the museum, both
could do more to thematize the limitations of the grid of gallery or museum.
Thinking about such places for art brings me back to Ziarek's question about contemporary art
and of an art to come. Heidegger's discussion of place, site, and spatiality is productive here.
What is the place of thinking, he asks, as he questions the bridge in "Building Dwelling
Thinking," or the Greek temple in the "Origin" essay. In writing about poetry, he asks what and
where is the Ort that grounds the Erörterung? Some places and sites, he thinks (however naive
and selective we might find his limitation to the Greek and German canon), resist enframing or
Gestell. These have the power of origin-ality.
Ziarek's question, then, is: what is art as affirmative site? I have already tried to blur the
distinction between "affirmative" and "productive," suggesting that the sense of the diagram at
work in Nietzsche and Foucault, and thematized by Deleuze, is already the conception of a
productive matrix. I hesitate to make a global assessment of the arts today in asking (a modified
version of Ziarek's question): what are the most promising forms of contemporary art? I can only
indicate one area which I find rich in possibilities for thinking. Elsewhere I've begun to articulate
some of the categories and distinctions that could constitute a geoaesthetics, in a variation on
Deleuzian geophilosophy, which in turn refers us to Nietzsche's question about the Sinn, sense or
direction, of the earth and his concept of an architecture in "the grand style." Foucault's
archaeology allows us to distinguish significant types among sites. So we can discriminate some
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of the major forms of landscape art or of the garden (which Kant and his contemporaries thought
of as a major art): the renaissance garden of similitudes, allegories, and resemblances; the
classical garden like Versailles that exhibits a centralizing principle of power; the English garden
of the era of man and his doubles, which while purporting to situate human beings in a natural
world denies and yet reveals its own framing activities.
I have named two projects that pose questions about the genealogy and prospects of art and they
may at first seem unrelated. On the one hand, an inquiry into the necessary and productive
absence of the image in the practice of ekphrasis; on the other, an attempt to understand the
diagrammatic character of what is variously called earth, land, or environmental art, including the
more traditional classifications of landscape architecture or design, and garden art. These two
directions, I suggest, are two distinct ways of coming to terms with what, for lack of a better term
at the moment, I will call the real (after Lacan). The first investigates the escape or absence of the
real, despite the multiplication of the symbolic or discursive; the second concerns the ways in
which art attempts to let the real emerge by diagrammatic constructions of the earth. Not so far
from Salt Lake City (where Ziarek and I discussed these questions at a 2005 symposium of the
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty extends
into the Great Salt Lake. It suggests the inevitability of entropy (which can be construed as sheer
multiplicity), the primacy of the geological, and the ruins of industrialization and globalization.
As I've argued elsewhere, Smithson's work can be seen as a Heideggerian disclosure of world and
earth. We can say with Ziarek that this work productively enacts a tensive relation of waste,
industry, nature, and the residues of several historical worlds (Native American, nineteenthcentury industrialism, and the more recent art of the multiple). Or with Foucault we can attempt to
articulate the diagram (his version of the Heideggerian Riss) by which this work institutes itself.
In many ways this is an art of Technik, but it does not follow that it is only reactive. It could be
called tragic because it reveals entropy, death, and dissolution; but Heidegger and Ziarek certainly
follow Nietzsche in seeing tragedy as affirmation.
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